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ABSTRACT. It is widely believed to be permissible for a physician to discontinue any​ ​treatment 
upon the request of a competent patient. Many also believe it is never permissible for a physician 
to intentionally kill a patient. I argue that the prospect of deactivating a patient's artificial heart 
presents us with a dilemma: either the first belief just mentioned is false or the second one is. 




New technology can lead us to reconsider old principles. The total artificial heart is one 
such technology, and the principles are two: 
(​DISCONTINUATION​) It is permissible for a physician to discontinue any​ ​treatment upon the 
request of a competent patient. 
(​PROHIBITION​) It is never permissible for a physician to intentionally kill a patient. 
DISCONTINUATION​ enjoys wide support within the medical community. ​PROHIBITION​ is 
controversial—as shown by the debates over euthanasia—but also enjoys considerable support.  
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Indeed, many people endorse both principles. I will argue, however, that the case of the total 
artificial heart presents us with a dilemma: either ​DISCONTINUATION​ is false or ​PROHIBITION​ is false. 
Whichever horn of the dilemma we choose has significant implications for contemporary 
medical ethics. 
Consider the following argument, with ​DISCONTINUATION​ serving as premise 1. 
1. It is permissible for a physician to discontinue any​ ​treatment upon the request of a 
competent patient. 
2. The total artificial heart provides ongoing treatment once implanted. 
3. Deactivating an artificial heart is an instance of killing rather than letting die. 
4. In deactivating an artificial heart, the physician intends the patient’s death. 
It follows from 1 and 2 that it is permissible for a physician to deactivate an artificial heart upon 
the request of a competent patient. It follows from 3 and 4 that deactivating an artificial heart is 
an instance of a physician intentionally killing a patient. Hence 1–4 entail that it is sometimes 
permissible for a physician to intentionally kill a patient—i.e. ​PROHIBITION​ is false.  
Below I argue that premises 2–4 are true. It follows that if ​DISCONTINUATION​ (premise 1) is 
true as well, then ​PROHIBITION​ is false. Equivalently, if ​PROHIBITION​ is true, then ​DISCONTINUATION​ is 
false. 
Before presenting my arguments for premises 2–4 I discuss two preliminaries. First, I 
indicate how my paper relates to several others and how it advances current debates. Second, I 
illustrate the popular support for ​DISCONTINUATION​ and ​PROHIBITION​. 
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SITUATING THE PAPER 
There is a distinction between ​killing ​and​ letting die​—or between killing someone and 
allowing​ them to die (Howard-Snyder 2011; Woollard 2012a, 2012b). If I push you into a lake 
and you drown, then I kill you. If you are already drowning and I simply refrain from saving 
you, then I let you die. I also let you die if I begin hauling you to shore but abandon my efforts. 
This latter case illustrates a general point: discontinuing life-saving aid that one is providing is 
often a case of letting die rather than killing. Indeed, the standard view is that a doctor who 
withdraws life-sustaining treatment does not kill the patient but merely allows the patient to die 
of the underlying medical condition. 
Miller, Truog, and Brock reject the standard view, claiming that withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment kills the patient (Brock 1986, 1992; Miller and Truog 2008, 2012; 
Miller, Truog, and Brock 2010a, 2010b). The structure of their argument can most clearly be 
seen in Miller and Truog’s book ​Death, Dying, and Organ Transplantation​. Understanding 
killing​ as equivalent to ​causing death​, they write: 
In arguing that withdrawing [life-sustaining treatment] causes a patient’s death . . . we 
appeal to our common-sense understanding of the causes of particular events. . . . Causes 
are events or circumstances that ​make the difference​ in explaining a particular 
occurrence. (2012, 6) 
At the same time, Miller and Truog believe that ​withholding​ of ​initial​ treatment (as opposed to 
withdrawal​ of ​ongoing​ treatment) merely ​allows​ the patient to die, since withholding initial 
treatment is an omission rather than an act (2012, 5–6). Their argument, then, is this: 
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withdrawing ongoing life-sustaining treatment is an ​act​ that ​makes the difference​ between the 
patient living and dying, and it follows from these facts that withdrawing treatment causes death, 
i.e. kills. This overarching argument is developed through various examples and subsidiary 
arguments in the first chapter of Miller and Truog’s book, as well as in the papers of Miller, 
Truog, and Brock cited above. 
That argument has been challenged by Jensen (2011) and McGee (2014, 2015). These 
authors follow McMahan (1993) in arguing that acts (and not only omissions) can allow a person 
to die. So even if discontinuing mechanical ventilation (for example) is an act rather than an 
omission, the ​effect​ of that act is that the doctor stops saving the patient—and hence the patient is 
not killed but merely allowed to die. 
I believe that my appeal to the artificial heart resists this response to Miller, Truog, and 
Brock. For I will argue that deactivating an artificial heart is importantly different from 
discontinuing other forms of life-sustaining treatment—the former is ​not​ an act that merely 
allows the patient to die, even if the latter ​is​. 
By making that claim I diverge sharply from previous authors writing about the total 
artificial heart. Bramstedt (2003a, 2003b, 2004) and Veatch (2003, 2004) are among the very few 
individuals who have given extended consideration to the ethics of deactivating the artificial 
heart. Bramstedt claims that deactivating an artificial heart is like discontinuing mechanical 
ventilation and is not an instance of killing. Veatch believes that Bramstedt would be correct if 
death were determined by neurological criteria rather than circulatory criteria. I return to both of 
these points below and explain why I disagree. My point now is simply to note one way in which 
the present paper contrasts with previous work on the artificial heart. I argue that the artificial 
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heart is not like other forms of life-sustaining treatment, and that it presents a more radical 
challenge to contemporary medical ethics than either Bramstedt or Veatch acknowledge. 
To be clear, I do ​not​ claim that deactivating an artificial heart differs from withdrawing 
other forms of life-sustaining treatment in that the former kills while the latter merely allows the 
patient to die. Rather, I note that ​according to the standard view,​ withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment merely allows the patient to die; and I claim that the standard view cannot 
accommodate the artificial heart ​even if it can accommodate ​other forms of life-sustaining 
treatment. I will not argue that the standard view ​can​ accommodate other forms of life-sustaining 
treatment. 
 
POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DISCONTINUATION AND PROHIBITION 
Gaylin et al. write of “one of the first and most hallowed canons of the medical ethic: 
doctors must not kill,” where killing is understood as “the active, willful taking of life” (1988, 
2139). They continue: “at least since the Oath of Hippocrates, Western medicine has regarded 
the killing of patients, even on request, as a profound violation of the deepest meaning of the 
medical vocation.” Similarly, the American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs writes that “[t]here is a longstanding prohibition against physicians killing their 
patients, based on a commitment that medicine is a profession dedicated to healing, and that its 
tools should not be used to cause patients’ deaths” (1992, 2232). The World Medical Association 
likewise states that “the act of deliberately ending the life of a patient, even at the patient's own 
request or at the request of close relatives, is unethical” (n.d.). So ​PROHIBITION​ finds support from 
individual physicians as well as prominent medical organizations. 
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DISCONTINUATION​ enjoys even broader support. Truog writes of “The Great American 
Consensus”—the principle that patients “have a virtually unlimited right to refuse any unwanted 
medical treatment, even if necessary for life itself” (2008, 45). The Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs firmly endorses this consensus: “The principle of patient autonomy requires that 
physicians respect a competent patient's decision to forgo any medical treatment. This principle 
is not altered when the likely result of withholding or withdrawing a treatment is hastening the 
patient's death” (1992, 2230). The same position is endorsed by the President’s Commission for 
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1983, 72). 
More recently, a consensus statement from seven professional and health organizations held that 
a “patient with decision-making capacity has the legal right to refuse or request the withdrawal 
of any medical treatment or intervention, regardless of whether s/he is terminally ill, and 
regardless of whether the treatment prolongs life and its withdrawal results in death” (Lampert et 
al. 2010, 1009). 
The authors quoted in the previous paragraph actually support something stronger than 
DISCONTINUATION​. They support the position that it is ​obligatory​ (and not merely ​permissible​) for a 
physician to discontinue any​ ​treatment upon the request of a competent patient. But if 
discontinuing treatment is obligatory then it is permissible, and so these authors must endorse 
DISCONTINUATION​. 
Some supporters of ​DISCONTINUATION​ would include an exception for public-health threats. 
In the case of Ebola virus, for example, perhaps individuals may permissibly be treated without 
their consent due to the risk the disease poses to others. 
In cases where the public’s health is not at risk, however, ​DISCONTINUATION​ is not thought 
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to admit of exceptions. The popular support for ​DISCONTINUATION​ reflects this fact: three 
paragraphs back, the three quotations each speak of refusing “any” unwanted treatment. 
Matters are similar when it comes to ​PROHIBITION​. The AMA’s Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs (1992) and the World Medical Association (n.d.) note no exception when stating 
their prohibitions on intentionally killing patients. Gaylin et al. are ​explicit​ that the prohibition is 
exceptionless, condemning “any and all acts of direct and intentional killing by physicians and 
their agents” (1988, 2140). Similarly, Pellegrino writes that physicians “must ​never​ kill. Nothing 
is more fundamental or uncompromising [than] this moral absolute” (2005, 475, emphasis 
added). 
It is the uncompromising nature of ​DISCONTINUATION​ and ​PROHIBITION​ that allows for their 
stark conflict in the case of the artificial heart. Apart from the noted public-health exception, 
their proponents do not think these principles can yield in cases that a doctor might encounter, 
such as cases in which the principles conflict with each other. Indeed, it is not typically thought 
that these principles ​can ​conflict with each other. Later I will explore the implications of making 
an exception to ​DISCONTINUATION​ or ​PROHIBITION​ for the artificial heart. 
With these preliminary comments out of the way, I turn to arguing for each of premises 
2–4 from the argument presented above. 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR PREMISES 2–4 
Premise 2: The Total Artificial Heart Provides Ongoing Treatment Once Implanted 
A transplanted organ becomes part of the patient’s body, and its operation does not 
constitute ongoing treatment. By contrast, a mechanical ventilator does not become part of the 
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body, instead retaining its identity as a device used to deliver treatment to the patient. 
It is generally accepted that in these respects an ​implanted pacemaker​ is like a ventilator 
rather than a transplanted organ. This position is endorsed, for example, by the seven 
professional and health organizations in the consensus statement of of Lampert et al. (2010). 
Unlike such life-sustaining devices as mechanical ventilators, an implanted pacemaker is internal 
to the patient’s body. But as Lampert et al. state, “there is no ethical or legal distinction between 
a treatment that’s integrated within the body, versus one which is outside the body” (2010, 
1011). Similarly, Kramer, Mitchell, and Brock argue that “there is no legal or ethical basis” for 
distinguishing between a pacemaker and a ventilator (2012, 291). Hence I will assume that an 
implanted pacemaker provides ongoing treatment as does a ventilator. 
Pacemakers and artificial hearts are relevantly similar. Both are implantable, inorganic 
devices that are used to restore cardiac function. A pacemaker replaces the activity of the heart’s 
own pacemaker cells, while an artificial heart replaces the heart’s ventricles. Because 
pacemakers and artificial hearts are similar in these ways, consistency requires that artificial 
hearts be given the same status as artificial pacemakers: if a pacemaker provides ongoing 
treatment, then an artificial heart does so as well. 
One might object that a pacemaker does​ ​not actually provide ongoing treatment, and 
hence neither does an artificial heart. For one might claim that “[o]nce the pacemaker is 
implanted, the doctor’s acts are complete,” and so “provision of the treatment has been 
completed” (McGee 2014, 45). 
In fact, the acts of doctors are not complete after a pacemaker is implanted. The 
pacemaker’s function will be periodically checked by a doctor—and adjusted, if need be. And 
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while the doctor might interact in this way with the pacemaker only infrequently, the pacemaker 
is all the while implementing the doctor’s intention to treat the patient. It is a tool being used by 
the doctor to manage the patient’s condition, as is a mechanical ventilator during those periods 
when the ventilator is not being checked, adjusted, or otherwise attended to. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that a doctor’s periodic checking and adjustment of a 
medical device are ​necessary​ for the device to be used to deliver ongoing treatment—but they 
are ​sufficient​. Hence I reject the objection noted two paragraphs back; an implanted pacemaker 
does provide ongoing treatment once implanted. Parallel remarks apply to the artificial heart. 
 
Premise 3: Deactivating an Artificial Heart  
Is an Instance of Killing Rather than Letting Die 
While both devices provide ongoing treatment, an artificial heart is importantly different 
from an implanted pacemaker when it comes to deactivation. According to the standard view, 
when deactivating a pacemaker leads to death, deactivation does not itself kill the patient but 
merely allows the patient to die of a preexisting condition. I will argue that no such story can be 
told about the artificial heart. Deactivating an artificial heart kills the patient. 
Suppose that Abe’s artificial heart is deactivated upon his request. If deactivation merely 
allows Abe to die, then what does it allow Abe to die of? What preexisting condition kills Abe? 
The most obvious answer is that deactivation allows Abe to die of ​heart disease 
(Bramstedt 2003b, 319; 2004, 427). If heart disease kills Abe, then heart disease must produce 
Abe’s lethal circulatory arrest. And that, in turn, requires that heart disease render Abe’s heart 
unable to pump blood. Of course, heart disease does not render Abe’s ​artificial​ heart unable to 
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pump blood. So if deactivation allows heart disease to kill Abe, then it must be that heart disease 
leaves Abe’s ​native​ heart unable to pump blood. 
In fact, heart disease does not leave Abe’s native heart unable to pump blood—or as I 
will say for brevity, heart disease does not “destroy” Abe’s native heart. We can see this point 
with the help of an analogy. Consider a terminally ill cancer patient who requests and receives a 
lethal injection. The patient was ​dying​ of cancer. The patient ​would have​ died of cancer, had a 
doctor not intervened. But the patient does not ​in fact​ die of cancer. The patient dies of the lethal 
injection. Similarly, Abe’s native heart was ​being destroyed​ by disease. It ​would have​ been 
destroyed by disease, had doctors not intervened. But Abe’s native heart is not ​in fact​ destroyed 
by disease. It is destroyed by doctors removing and discarding it. After all, Abe’s native heart 
was functional enough to sustain life prior to surgery, but not after. 
As I said above, if deactivation allows heart disease to kill Abe, then it must be that 
disease destroys Abe’s native heart. We have just seen, however, that disease does not destroy 
Abe’s native heart. Hence deactivation does not allow heart disease to kill Abe. 
Of course, Abe’s doctors remove (and hence destroy) his native heart ​because​ of the 
heart disease. This does not, however, mean that heart disease is what destroys Abe’s native 
heart. After all, the doctor of the terminal cancer patient administers the lethal injection ​because 
of the cancer. Yet it is not cancer that kills the patient. To say that disease destroys Abe’s native 
heart is like saying that the cancer patient who receives a lethal injection actually dies of cancer. 
I am ​not​ suggesting that the removal of Abe’s native heart kills him. I claim that Abe’s 
doctors destroy his native heart, but I make that claim only in order to reject the suggestion that 
deactivation allows Abe to die of heart disease. 
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While I am not making such a suggestion, my ​opponent​ might suggest that the removal of 
Abe’s native heart kills him. Then deactivating Abe’s artificial heart would merely allow him to 
die of the surgery that removes his native heart—or, perhaps equivalently, to die of his 
(iatrogenic) lack of a biological heart. When Abe’s doctors remove his native heart, their aim is 
not Abe’s death. So one might think that Abe’s doctors do not intentionally kill him, as there is 
no act that both kills and aims at death: deactivating the artificial heart may aim at death but it 
merely allows death, and removal of the native heart kills but does not aim at death. 
The essential thought here is that removing Abe’s native heart creates a threat that his 
artificial heart keeps at bay—so that deactivating the artificial heart allows the original threat to 
kill Abe. Similarly, it is often thought that mechanical ventilation keeps at bay a preexisting 
threat—a disease or injury that prevents spontaneous breathing—and that withdrawing 
ventilation allows this threat to kill the patient. 
In order to evaluate this proposal, note that the treatment for Abe’s heart disease involves 
his doctors removing his native heart and implanting an artificial heart. According to the 
proposal now being considered, removing Abe’s native heart creates a new, lethal threat that his 
artificial heart keeps at bay. So according to this proposal, the treatment for Abe’s heart disease 
involves his doctors creating a new, lethal threat and then keeping that threat at bay. This is an 
odd view. It is more natural to think that Abe’s doctors simply treat the original threat to his 
health (heart disease) without creating another threat. ​After a successful surgery, there is no 
ongoing lethal threat that the doctors have created. 
It might be objected that I have misconstrued the proposal in question. Perhaps one 
individual can let another die without there being a ​preexisting​ ​threat​ that the latter is allowed to 
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die of. For example, Kamm writes: 
[M]ost of us have never been under threat of starvation, because we have always been 
provided with the food that is a defense against starvation. If the person supplying our 
food should stop, I suggest that he lets us die, but we face the threat of starvation for the 
first time. What has been already present is a need or vulnerability that would, without 
help, have led to a threat. (2007, 18–19) 
Similarly, McMahan claims that “it is possible for an agent to allow an individual to die when 
the only threat the individual faces is a threat latent in his own inherent dependency on aid from 
the agent” (2002, 385–386; cf. 1993, 269–273). 
So perhaps deactivation of Abe’s artificial heart merely allows him to die after all. There 
is a sense in which surgery makes Abe ​dependent​ on the ongoing action of an artificial heart: it is 
only after surgery that Abe’s life is sustained by the artificial heart. So while deactivation does 
not allow Abe to die of a ​preexisting​ threat, perhaps it allows a lethal threat to ​develop​—a threat 
“latent” in Abe’s “dependency on aid” provided by the artificial heart (ibid.). This may be to 
allow Abe to die of the surgery that made him dependent on the artificial heart. That surgery was 
not performed with deadly intent, however. So, as before, there is no act that both kills and is 
performed with deadly intent. 
The problem with this suggestion is that if one individual makes another dependent on 
aid, then withdrawing that aid can be an instance of killing. Consider the following example 
from Persson and Savulescu: 
Suppose we have started a machine that regularly supplies the dying Victim with a drug 
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which has a good chance of being substantially life-prolonging. But this drug is such that 
the body thoroughly adapts to it. So, if it is withdrawn the Victim quickly dies of a sort of 
shock and not of the underlying disease. (2005, 17) 
Persson and Savulescu conclude that to withdraw aid in this case would “clearly” be killing 
rather than letting die (ibid.). I believe this is the correct conclusion, and that it is not changed by 
supposing the drug is withdrawn at the patient’s request. 
The case of the artificial heart is relevantly similar. In both cases, treatment is initiated to 
prolong the patient’s life. In both cases, that initial treatment makes the patient dependent on 
continuing treatment. (For as I have said, is only ​after​ surgery that Abe’s life is sustained by the 
ongoing action of an artificial heart.) And in both cases, I suggest, discontinuing treatment does 
not merely allow a latent threat to develop. 
I conclude that deactivating Abe’s artificial heart kills him. In this respect deactivating an 
artificial heart is like administering a lethal injection that stops a patient’s biological heart. 
It is important to note that my argument does not generalize to withdrawing other forms 
of life-sustaining treatment. For one thing, I have appealed to the fact that Abe’s native heart is 
not destroyed by disease. In a pacemaker-dependent individual, by contrast, disease ​has​ left the 
heart unable to function unassisted. And similarly for the lungs of a ventilator-dependent patient. 
Hence my argument does not apply to such cases—the artificial heart is importantly different. 
Before concluding this section, there are three objections to consider. First, it might be 
claimed that to kill someone is to ​intervene​ in their life; and that deactivating an artificial heart 
ends ​the medical intervention; and hence that deactivating an artificial heart ​cannot​ be killing.  
It is possible to kill by ending an intervention, however. The case from Persson and 
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Savulescu (“Shock”) provides one example. Here is another example. If I pick you and up carry 
you around, that constitutes an intervention in your life. If I release you, that ends my 
intervention. But releasing you might also kill you—e.g. if you fell to the ground and hit your 
head upon being released. This latter example is less analogous to the case of the artificial heart, 
but it illustrates the present point: it cannot be claimed that ending an intervention never kills, 
hence the objection from the previous paragraph does not succeed. 
The second objection to consider is this. I have claimed that deactivating an artificial 
heart ​kills​ even if deactivating an implanted pacemaker merely ​allows​ the pacemaker-dependent 
individual to die. But deactivating the former device has the ​same results​ as deactivating the 
latter: circulatory arrest and the biochemical processes that then occur and eventuate in death. 
How, then, can I claim that the former deactivation kills even if the latter does not? 
In a pacemaker-dependent individual, deactivating the pacemaker indeed results in 
circulatory arrest (and the consequent biochemical processes) just as deactivating an artificial 
heart does. The difference is how these events are to be explained. In the one case, it is possible 
to claim that deactivating the pacemaker merely allows a preexisting condition to produce the 
lethal circulatory arrest. After all, disease has left the patient’s heart unable to function 
unassisted. I have argued that, by contrast, no such claim can be made about an artificial heart. In 
that case deactivation itself is what produces circulatory arrest and kills the patient. 
There is one more objection to consider. According to Veatch, “the conclusion that 
stopping [an artificial heart] is a direct killing rests on the use of the traditional cardiac denition 
of death. One dies according to current law when ​either​ the heart or the brain function ceases 
irreversibly” (2004, 2; cf. 2003, 309–310). But if we reject this “naive and implausible 
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two-pronged definition of death” and “replace it with one relying only on brain function loss,” 
then deactivating an artificial heart “would turn out to be no different from stopping any other 
life-supporting treatment.” 
I have argued that deactivating an artificial heart does not merely allow the patient to die. 
My arguments could easily be rephrased in terms of brain death, rather than death ​simpliciter​. 
We would then conclude that deactivating an artificial heart does not merely allow a preexisting 
condition to deprive the brain of oxygen. Rather, deactivation ​itself​ produces brain death. Hence 
deactivating an artificial heart kills even if we reject the cardiac criterion of death. 
 
Premise 4: In Deactivating an Artificial Heart,  
the Physician Intends the Patient's Death 
On a traditional view, the killing of a patient can sometimes be permissible when death is 
not ​intended​ but is merely ​foreseen​. For example: Perhaps adequate pain relief never actually 
requires a dose of opiates so large as to produce lethal respiratory depression as a side effect 
(Sykes and Thorns 2003). Nonetheless, it is widely held that ​if​ adequate pain relief ​were ​to 
require a lethal dose, administering such a dose could be permissible. And it is thought that 
administering such a dose could be permissible, in part, because death would at most be 
foreseen—unlike a case of euthanasia, where death is intended as the means by which suffering 
is ended (Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 1992, 2231). These remarks illustrate a fact 
about the prohibition on the killing of patients. What is prohibited is killing where death is 
intended​—or “intentional killing,” as I am using the term.  1
1 Some believe that an agent can​ intentionally ​kill without ​intending​ to kill—and hence without intending 
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Now consider a doctor who deactivates an artificial heart at the request of a patient. What 
does the doctor intend when deactivating the artificial heart, if not the patient’s death? Two 
answers are suggested by the literature on withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. First, it might 
be claimed that the doctor intends to ​comply​ ​with the patient’s request​ to discontinue treatment. 
Second, it might be claimed that the doctor intends to​ eliminate the burdens​ of treatment. I will 
argue that in the case of the artificial heart, a doctor who intends either of those things will also 
intend the patient’s death. 
First consider the suggestion that in deactivating an artificial heart, the doctor intends to 
eliminate the burdens of treatment. Some treatments are indeed discontinued because the 
treatment is burdensome. Discontinuing chemotherapy may improve the patient’s quality of life, 
for example. Hence the aim of discontinuing chemotherapy can be to eliminate the burdens of 
treatment, with the hastening of death merely foreseen as a side effect. 
An artificial heart carries some burdens, such as risk of infection or blood clots. For a 
patient who desires deactivation, however, the primary burden of an artificial heart is that the 
device prolongs a life that is independently burdensome (cf. Rhymes et al. 2000, 1062). The 
patient described by Bruce et al. (2014), for example, suffered from the failure of multiple organs 
and had to endure frequent hospitalizations. In fact, the patient stated that he would not want to 
live even if a heart transplant were available (628). Death is a necessary means to eliminating the 
burdens of treatment in such a case, since the primary burden of treatment is simply continued 
life. A physician who intends to eliminate the burdens of treatment will also intend the means, 
death. (These are individuals who reject the so-called Simple View of intention; see Bratman 1987, ch. 8.) 
As I have suggested, however, that is not the sense of “intentionally kill” that is relevant to the current 
prohibition on the killing of patients: what is prohibited is killing while intending death. So when I say 
“intentionally kill” in the main text, I mean “kill while intending death." 
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and hence will intend the patient’s death. 
Next consider the suggestion that in deactivating an artificial heart, the doctor does not 
intend to eliminate the burdens of treatment, but intends only to comply with the patient’s 
request for deactivation. We can proceed by comparing these two claims: 
A. In deactivating an artificial heart, the physician need not intend the patient’s death, but 
instead can merely intend to comply with the patient’s request to discontinue a medical 
intervention. 
B. In administering an injection of potassium chloride, the physician need not intend the 
patient’s death, but instead can merely intend to comply with the patient’s request to 
provide a medical intervention. 
B refers to a case of euthanasia, as the injection will stop the patient’s heart. Suppose the patient 
asks for a specific dose of potassium chloride, a dose that both patient and physician know will 
be lethal. 
Such a physician (as described by B) would intend to comply with the patient’s request 
for a potassium chloride injection. Would the physician ​also​ intend the patient’s death? 
According to a common view, the physician ​would​ intend the patient’s death because the 
injection is in some sense “too close” to the patient’s death for the former to be intended but not 
the latter.  2
2 For overviews of the issue of “closeness” see FitzPatrick (2012, §2), Nelkin and Rickless (2015). It is 
worth noting that Bratman’s (1987) theory of intention will not yield the conclusion that death is intended 
by the doctor (who intends to comply with a request for a potassium chloride injection). This is because 
Bratman’s theory is consistent with intentions being very specific (or “fine grained”); see Di Nucci (2014, 
ch. 6.2), Nelkin and Rickless (2015, §5). 
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Matters are exactly similar with respect to A. Such a physician would intend to comply 
with the patient’s request for artificial heart deactivation. Would the physician also intend the 
patient’s death? With just as much plausibility as before, we can say that the physician would 
intend the patient’s death because deactivation is too closely connected to the patient’s death for 
the former to be intended but not the latter. 
In making these remarks I rely on the fact that deactivation of the one patient’s artificial 
heart is at least as closely connected to death as is administration of a potassium chloride 
injection to the other patient. This indeed appears to be a fact, thanks to several comparisons 
between the two cases. First, deactivating an artificial heart is like administering a potassium 
chloride injection insofar as it is a case of ​killing​ rather than ​letting die​. (I have argued for that 
point above and hence can assume it here.) Second, both deactivation and injection stop the 
patient’s circulation, and deactivation stops circulation ​directly​ (without intervening events). 
There is also a third comparison worth mentioning, though it may not actually be relevant to 
determining how “close” an intervention is to the patient’s death. In the one case, the patient 
requests a potassium chloride injection ​because​ it will result in death. In the other case, the 
patient requests deactivation for the same reason—recall that the patient described by Bruce et 
al. (2014) no longer wanted to live.  3
I conclude that A and B are exactly similar in the relevant respects. Hence they must be 
3 For the purposes of determining the doctor’s intention, perhaps what is relevant is whether the doctor 
believes​ that these comparisons hold between deactivation and injection. If that is right, then consider a 
doctor who believes the comparisons hold. The argument provided in the main text suggests that 
deactivation will then be a case of intentional killing, yet deactivation will also be permissible (since it is 
permissible to withdraw treatment at the request of a competent patient). Hence the argument still secures 
the conclusion that there are circumstances under which it is permissible to intentionally kill a patient 
(assuming, of course, that ​DISCONTINUATION​ is true). 
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treated similarly. If we ​reject​ both A and B, then a physician who intends to comply with a 
patient’s request for deactivation will also intend the patient’s death, and my argument proceeds 
as planned. If we ​accept​ both A and B, then my overarching argument in this paper fails—as a 
physician who deactivates an artificial heart might not intend the patient’s death, contrary to my 
premise 4. While my overarching argument would fail to establish its conclusion, accepting both 
A and B would secure a conclusion just as noteworthy. For if B were true, then contrary to what 
is nearly universally assumed, euthanasia need not violate the prohibition on intentionally killing 
patients. The physician would simply have to intend to comply with the patient’s request to 
provide a medical intervention—as it happens, a ​lethal​ intervention—without thereby intending 
the patient’s death (exactly as B suggests).  4
I assume most readers will dismiss such a possibility, however, thereby rejecting B. I 
have argued that consistency requires these readers reject A as well. So I will proceed on the 
assumption that A is false—and hence that a doctor who intends to comply with a patient’s 
request for deactivation will also intend the patient’s death. 
I began this section by asking what a doctor intends when deactivating an artificial heart 
at the request of a patient, if not the patient’s death. I considered two answers: first, that the 
doctor intends to eliminate the burdens of treatment; and second, that the doctor intends to 
4 Might euthanasia always involve ​some ​intention that makes the procedure impermissible, even if it is not 
always ​death​ that is intended? It is hard to see how that could be the case ​if deactivating a patient’s 
artificial heart is permissible​. For I have argued that deactivation and euthanasia are alike with respect to 
the doctor’s potential intentions. (Both can be performed while intending to comply with the patient’s 
request, and both can be performed while intending to eliminate the patient’s burdens ​via​ their death.) So 
if euthanasia must always involve an impermissible intention, then why is the same not true of 
deactivation? One might resort to the claim that the doctor’s intention ​would​ make deactivation 
impermissible ​except​ for the fact that deactivation is necessitated by the patient’s right to refuse treatment. 
But see the final three paragraphs of the section “Implications” for doubts about this type of strategy. 
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comply with the patient’s request to discontinue treatment. I have now argued that in the case of 
the artificial heart, a doctor who intends either of those things will also intend the patient’s death.
 5
One might object, however, by arguing that: I have granted my opponent the claim that 
deactivating a pacemaker involves merely foreseeing (rather than intending) the death of the 
pacemaker-dependent individual; with respect to intent, deactivating a pacemaker is relevantly 
similar to deactivating an artificial heart; hence I cannot claim that deactivating an artificial heart 
involves intending death. 
There are two responses to this objection. First, it is worth noting that deactivating a 
pacemaker might ​not​ be relevantly similar to deactivating an artificial heart with respect to 
intent. I have argued that the latter deactivation is an instance of ​killing​ even if the former is 
merely ​letting die​. It might be thought that precisely because it is not an instance of killing, 
deactivating a pacemaker is not “too close” to death—and hence that one can intend pacemaker 
deactivation without intending death. If that is so, then there would indeed be a difference in 
intention between deactivating an artificial heart and deactivating a pacemaker. 
More importantly, however, the first premise of the objection in question is false. I have 
not​ granted that (a) deactivating a pacemaker involves merely ​foreseeing​ (rather than intending) 
5 Similar arguments can be given in response to other suggestions regarding the doctor’s intent. It might 
be suggested, for example, that in deactivating a patient’s artificial heart the doctor intends to act in the 
patient’s interest. But while the doctor’s ​end​ may be to act in the patient’s interest, an intended ​means​ will 
be to eliminate the burdens of treatment. And I have argued that, in the case of the artificial heart, a doctor 
who intends to eliminate the burdens of treatment will also intend the patient’s death. As a second 
example, it might be suggested that the doctor intends to respect the patient’s right to self-determination. 
While the doctor’s end may be to respect the patient’s right to self-determination, an intended means will 
be to comply with the patient’s request to discontinue treatment. And I have already addressed the 
suggestion that the doctor might intend to comply with the patient’s request but not intend the patient’s 
death. 
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death. Rather, I have granted that perhaps (b) deactivating a pacemaker involves merely ​allowing 
death (rather than killing). 
Still, one might wonder whether (b) entails (a)—whether merely allowing death ​entails 
merely foreseeing death. There is no such entailment, however. One can merely allow death 
while intending death. This possibility is illustrated by Rachels’ famous case of a man who 
allows his young cousin to drown in order to secure an inheritance (1975, 79). Hence neither do I 
grant (a) nor do I grant anything that entails (a). So the objection (from three paragraphs back) 
fails because it relies on the premise that I am committed to (a). 
This concludes my defense of the premises of my argument. I turn next to the 
implications of the argument. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
According to ​DISCONTINUATION​, it is permissible for a physician to discontinue any 
treatment upon the request of a competent patient. According to ​PROHIBITION​, it is never 
permissible for a physician to intentionally kill a patient. 
Premises 1–4 yield the conclusion that ​PROHIBITION​ is false, as deactivating an artificial 
heart would be a case where it is permissible to intentionally kill a patient. I have provided 
arguments for premises 2–4. I have not argued for premise 1 (​DISCONTINUATION​), however, beyond 
noting that it currently enjoys wide support within the medical community. Some may endorse 
DISCONTINUATION​ and hence conclude that ​PROHIBITION​ is false. But others may stand by ​PROHIBITION 
and conclude that ​DISCONTINUATION​ is false. I will now consider the consequences of each of these 
two positions. 
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First suppose we conclude that ​DISCONTINUATION​ is false. We might then claim that it is 
obligatory (and hence permissible) for a physician to discontinue any​ ​treatment upon the request 
of a competent patient ​unless​ doing so would conflict with a more stringent obligation, such as 
the obligation not to intentionally kill a patient. 
Adopting that position would have several noteworthy implications. First, there would 
then be an exception to the common claim that ​withdrawing​ ongoing life-sustaining treatment is 
permissible whenever ​withholding​ initial treatment would be permissible in the same 
circumstances (Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 1992, 2231; 2012, opinion 2.20). After 
all, with patient consent it is permissible to withhold the treatment provided by an artificial heart 
(by not implanting the artificial heart). But if ​DISCONTINUATION​ is false, then it is not permissible to 
withdraw that treatment (by deactivating the heart). The relevant difference would be that 
withholding the implantation of an artificial heart would be ​letting die​, while deactivating an 
artificial heart would be ​intentionally​ ​killing​. 
Rejecting ​DISCONTINUATION​ would also result in a new exception to the requirement of 
obtaining informed consent. With few exceptions, consent must be obtained before treating a 
competent individual (ibid., opinion 8.08). But if a physician is not permitted to deactivate an 
artificial heart upon the patient’s request, then the physician must continue providing treatment 
via the artificial heart without consent—not only ​without​ consent, but ​against​ the patient’s 
explicit demands. 
There would be a striking difference in this regard between the treatment of patients with 
artificial hearts and the treatment of those with artificial pacemakers (or other cardiac implants). 
Deactivating the former device kills the patient, while the standard view is that deactivating the 
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latter merely allows the patient to die (when death in fact ensues). Hence those who accept that 
standard view and retain ​PROHIBITION​ (rejecting ​DISCONTINUATION​) must say that deactivating a 
pacemaker is permissible but deactivating an artificial heart is not, even when each deactivation 
would immediately lead to the patient’s death. Some will find the case of the artificial heart too 
similar to that of the pacemaker to allow such disparate judgments. Such individuals may thus be 
led to accept that it is permissible to intentionally kill a patient in the case of deactivating an 
artificial heart. 
Suppose, then, that we retain ​DISCONTINUATION​ and reject ​PROHIBITION​. In that case, 
opponents of euthanasia could no longer claim that it is categorically unethical to intentionally 
kill a patient (see, e.g., Rigterink 1984; Gaylin et al. 1988; Kass 1989; Pellegrino 2005; Garcia 
2007). For deactivating an artificial heart would be a case where such an action is ethical. Of 
course, it might be claimed that it is impermissible to intentionally kill a patient ​unless​ doing so 
is necessitated by the patient’s refusal of treatment. 
There is, however, some reason to believe that intentionally killing a patient would be 
permissible in other circumstances as well. For suppose that a patient does not ​refuse​ continued 
treatment, i.e. does not actually withdraw consent to treatment. Suppose instead the patient states 
that he or she very much ​prefers​ the artificial heart be deactivated but will not insist on it if the 
doctor objects. Some will think it permissible for the doctor to provide deactivation in this 
scenario, at least if the patient has a very poor quality of life and little chance of improvement. 
Such readers must reject the suggestion that intentionally killing a patient is permissible only 
when necessitated by the patient’s right to refuse treatment. 
More generally, such readers should be drawn to the following conclusion. If the 
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objections to intentionally killing a patient can be outweighed by a patient’s ​preferences​ or 
interests​ with respect to discontinuing treatment—as opposed to the patient’s ​right​ to discontinue 
treatment—then presumably those objections can also be outweighed by the preferences or 
interests of a terminally ill patient who wishes to preclude pain, indignity, or the loss of 
autonomy. If so, then intentionally killing a patient would be permissible in many cases familiar 
from the euthanasia debates—not just in the case of deactivating a patient’s artificial heart.  6
 
CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
I have argued that deactivating an artificial heart poses a dilemma: either it is sometimes 
permissible for a physician to intentionally kill a patient, or it is sometimes impermissible to 
discontinue treatment upon the request of a competent patient. Whichever horn of the dilemma 
we choose has significant implications for contemporary medical ethics. 
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